Distinguishing tests from accountability in nclb (opinion)
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There are some wild intellectual gymnastics on display among those Beltway types who are scrambling to keep Senator Lamar Alexander, Representative John Kline, and their Republican allies
from dialing back the federal role in education to something more appropriate and constructive. These advocates (mostly located at left-leaning advocacy groups and Arne Duncan’s U.S.
Department of Education) acknowledge that NCLB is deeply flawed ... and then insist that efforts to overhaul it constitute a “retreat.” For instance, Duncan was a case study in confusion on
Monday, when he first decried NCLB as “broken” and unduly “prescriptive"—and then insisted that Congress should fix the law while keeping all its major elements ... and _adding_ new
ones! Now_ I’m_ confused. The way out of this thicket isn’t that hard. In fact, it’s the design principle for Alexander’s draft Senate bill (released yesterday). The principle is that
transparency is a good thing. Identifying schools that need to improve is a good thing. And doing something to help schools improve and/or to give new options to those students in them is a
good thing. But it’s destructive to bundle these in the way NCLB did. Moreover, as I’ve long argued, only the first of these is something the federal government is well-positioned to wade
into. Checker Finn and I wrote a piece for _Education Next_ on all this back in 2007, and I’ll just quote from that for a moment—because I think we got it right then and I have to go teach
class now. > Enacted in 2001, the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) began with the > resounding promise that every U.S. schoolchild will attain > "proficiency" in reading
and math by 2014. Noble, yes, but also > naive, misleading, and in some respects dysfunctional. While nobody > doubts that the number of "proficient" students in America can
and > should increase dramatically from today's woeful level, no educator > believes that universal proficiency in 2014 is attainable. Only > politicians promise such things.
The inevitable result is weary > cynicism among school practitioners and a "compliance" mentality > among state and local officials. In hindsight, NCLB's passage was
> less about improving schools or fostering results-based public > sector accountability than about declaring fealty to a gallant but > utopian ambition, one that the statute welded
to a clumsy, > heavy-handed set of procedural mandates. NCLB is, in fact, a civil > rights manifesto masquerading as an education accountability system. > Its grand ambition
provided a shaky basis for policymaking, rather > as if Congress asserted in the name of energy reform that America > will no longer need to import oil after 2014 or fought crime by
> declaring that by that date all U.S. cities would be peaceable > kingdoms. NCLB's particular brand of hubris has solid precedent. > Picture John Kennedy pledging in 1961 that
"America will get 75 > percent of the way to the moon by decade's end." Or former President > Bush and the governors solemnly declaring in 1990 that the U.S. > would
be 12th in the world in math and science by the year 2000. > Indeed, it's practically un-American to aim for anything less than > the top. Moreover, NCLB's backers can
legitimately argue that they > had already spent nearly two decades asking state and local > officials and education leaders to address mediocre school > performance and stubborn
race- and class-linked inequities in > educational outcomes. In that light, the passion-drenched > unseriousness infusing NCLB is forgivable, even honorable. And NCLB > indeed has
virtues: it produced long-overdue school transparency, > focused unprecedented attention on achievement, created urgency > where lethargy had ruled, and offers valuable political cover
to > determined superintendents and principals. Kennedy's promise was > kept in just eight years, when it turned out that money, brainpower, > and determination could surmount
the technical challenges posed by a > moon landing. The "first in the world" goal, however, was not > attained and quickly became the stuff of mockery. The NCLB >
accountability system was adopted with scant attention to principles > of sound public-sector accountability, how the statute's many pieces > fit together, or whether they could
be competently deployed through > the available machinery. Meanwhile, the statute's rhetoric invites a > backlash that may not only gut the law, but also discredit the >
increasingly fruitful goal-setting, school-changing, > choice-conferring results that have marked education reform since > 1983. As the calendar rolls toward 2011 and 2012, and sharp
> increases in proficiency rates become necessary, the number of > schools failing to make adequate progress will rise precipitously. > Unless current standards are eased, thousands
of schools that > communities had long regarded as effective are going to be > tarnished. Claims of moral urgency and vague paeans to > accountability are unlikely to prove much of
a match for community > pride and fears for property values. Moreover, many of those > schools, while doubtless less effective than they ought to be for at > least some kids, are
pretty decent and far better than the > urban-disaster schools, where the case for mandated interventions is > unarguable. There's nothing wrong with lofty ambitions. Yet >
political compromises meant that NCLB's grand aspirations were > saddled with sputtering machinery and weak sanctions. Few Americans > realize that, for states to keep their Title
I dollars, they need > only to set goals, administer tests, report results, and see that > districts intervene in specified ways in low-performing schools. > NCLB doesn't
actually mandate that kids learn anything. If the kids > don't learn, or if their schools don't improve, no sanctions follow > (save possible embarrassment) so long as
officials comply with the > procedural requirements. The money keeps on flowing. NCLB's > architects thought they were devising an elaborate plan to alter the > behavior of
thousands of schools and millions of educators, drawing > on a mix of goals, rewards, sanctions, choices, and sunlight. They > overlooked the fact that effective behavior-changing
regimens are > rooted in realistic expectations and joined to palpable incentives > and punishments; NCLB provides none of these. Finally, for those who think a legislative compromise
can or will address these problems by yielding federal guidelines and prescriptions that are sensitive to the challenges of doing this kind of accountability, well, I’ve a fabulous bridge to
sell you in Brooklyn. But that’s a discussion for another day. In the meantime, go take a look at Andy Rudalevige’s terrific chapter from my 2012 book (with Andrew Kelly) _Carrots, Sticks,
and the Bully Pulpit_.