Property rights in a very poor country: tenure insecurity and investment in ethiopia
- Select a language for the TTS:
- UK English Female
- UK English Male
- US English Female
- US English Male
- Australian Female
- Australian Male
- Language selected: (auto detect) - EN
Play all audios:
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A VERY POOR COUNTRY: TENURE INSECURITY AND INVESTMENT IN ETHIOPIA CONTENTS * Abstract * Citation * Links ABSTRACT This article provides evidence from one of the poorest
countries in the world that the institutions of property rights matter for efficiency, investment, and growth. With all land state-owned, the threat of land redistribution never appears far
off the agenda. Land rental and leasing have been made legal, but transfer rights remain restricted and the perception of continuing tenure insecurity remains quite strong. Using a unique
panel data set, this study investigates whether transfer rights and implied tenure insecurity affect household investment decisions, focusing on trees and shrubs. The panel data estimates
suggest that limited perceived transfer rights negatively affects the long-term investment in Ethiopian agriculture, contributing to the low returns from land and perpetuating low growth and
poverty. CITATION Ali, D.A.; Dercon, S.; Madhur Gautam. Property rights in a very poor country: tenure insecurity and investment in Ethiopia. Agricultural Economics (2011) 42 (1) 75-86.
[DOI: 10.1111/j.1574-0862.2010.00482.x] LINKS Property rights in a very poor country: tenure insecurity and investment in Ethiopia UPDATES TO THIS PAGE Published 1 January 2011 Contents