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Whoever you deem responsible – whether it is the Iranians for their alleged provocation or Washington for its supposed aggression – the rise in tension in the Gulf, and the very real

prospect of another confrontation in the Middle East, shed interesting light on an issue that at first sight seems wholly disparate: Britain and its relations with the European Union. Ever

since the June 2016 referendum, many EU enthusiasts have claimed that Britain will ‘lose global influence’ as a result of its outcome. Such sentiments, often voiced ever since Britain joined

the Common Market in 1973, became particularly apparent earlier this year, when a study by the United Nations Association reported its findings. One former ambassador to the UN argued that

our reputation ‘would be in sort of free-fall territory’, while a counterpart stated that ‘most other people – almost without exception – think we’ve shot ourselves in the foot’. Sir Simon

Fraser, the former foreign office permanent secretary, said: ‘fundamentally and structurally, I think our position, and our leverage in international institutions, will be weaker once we

have left the European Union’. But these assertions need to be closely examined and questioned. Just weigh them up against the reaction to American claims about Iran’s responsibility for the

explosions that rocked two oil tankers, one Norwegian and the other Japanese, in the Gulf of Oman last Thursday. On the one hand, Foreign Minister Jeremy Hunt has said that responsibility

‘almost certainly’ lies with the Iranian regime, adding that ‘these latest attacks build on a pattern of destabilising Iranian behaviour and pose a serious danger to the region’. At the same

time, the Foreign Office issued a statement, saying that it was ‘almost certain’ that a branch of the Iranian military – was culpable because ‘no other state or non-state actor could

plausibly have been responsible’ But contrast this with the different messages emanating from other European capitals. The German Foreign Minister, Heiko Maas, voiced doubts about a US Navy

video that purported to ‘prove’ Iran’s role. ‘The video is not enough. We can understand what is being shown, sure, but to make a final assessment, this is not enough for me’, as Maas told a

press conference on Friday. At the same time, the EU’s foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, urged her fellow diplomats not to jump to conclusions and instead to apply ‘the maximum

restraint and wisdom’. The French, in the meantime, have been relatively silent about the affair, steering a careful course between their American allies on the one hand and their fellow

Europeans on the other. Such sharp divergences of view prompt an obvious question: if the British government disagrees so sharply with its fellow Europeans on such an important issue, how

can its membership (past and present) of the EU provide it with ‘global influence’? How can other countries and actors assume our unanimity and cooperation when we are at such odds? Such

membership simply provides a superficial unity to a wide-ranging and often conflicting set of views and positions, each based on different interests and traditions. Our own such interests

and traditions are of course considerably more Atlanticist than those of fellow Europeans: since 1941, and possibly since 1917, we have had a much closer relationship with Washington, one

that was affirmed and deepened by the Suez debacle and by the existence of shared nuclear and intelligence (‘Five Eyes’) capabilities. It is of course difficult not to be reminded of the

Iraq War, when the EU’s ‘global influence’ descended into bitter fractiousness as Britain sided with George W. Bush to attack Saddam Hussein, so strongly and publicly opposed by both the

French and German governments. So much for our ‘global influence’ with our EU partners. Of course Britain, like any country, can achieve more if it works with others. But Remainers need to

explain why this should dictate membership of a European federal union instead of, much more simply, a more traditional approach based on cooperation, alliances and partnerships with a

myriad of potential overseas friends, some of whom may be much better allies in the circumstances of the moment. Besides, true ‘global influence’ is won through building a strong state and

economy, and maintaining the high standards of our armed forces, rather than fanciful talk about building a European superstate.