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On Friday Olaf Scholz will pay his first visit to London since he took office last December. The persistent coolness towards Britain in Berlin explains why the no longer new German

Chancellor has taken so long about coming here. Before Brexit, London would have been next on the list after Paris and Washington. When the UK experienced fuel supply problems a few months

ago, Scholz was quick to indulge in schadenfreude. That boot is now firmly on the other foot. It’s a sign of how much the war in Ukraine has altered the landscape that Scholz has now decided

that he needs to talk. Britain not only remains Germany’s most important European NATO ally, but is the most conspicuous in providing the military assistance that has enabled the Ukrainians

to turn the tide of battle. Soon after the invasion, the Chancellor lifted the ban on lethal weapons to Ukraine, but despite having one of the largest arms industries in Europe, the Germans

have yet to do anything comparable to the British. And that is only the first of the items on the list of ways in which Germany is failing Ukraine. Even more serious is the fact that

Russian gas and oil imports to EU states (among which the Federal Republic is by far the biggest) have bankrolled Putin to the tune of more £20 billion during this war. Moreover, the German

and Russian economies remain so closely integrated that they are nowhere near a full embargo. Berlin leads the bloc within the EU that is resisting tougher sanctions and a trade boycott of

Russia. Boris Johnson needs to do two things. First, he must listen attentively to Scholz, who will doubtless invoke German angst about provoking Putin, explain why it is impossible for

Germany to do more for Ukraine, either on the military or the economic front. The Chancellor may remind the Prime Minister that Germany has a very different history, and hence attitude to

military action, from Britain. He dare not move too far ahead of German public opinion, perhaps citing the Hungarian election victory for Viktor Orbán’s policy of neutrality in the war as an

example of the innate caution of nations who have experienced Russian occupation in living memory. He will explain that ending Germany’s dependency on Russian energy is a highly complex

process. Of course the German people recognises its moral responsibility to Ukraine, Scholz will say, but the experts tell him that changing course across the board will take time: many

months, if not years. Having acknowledged all these explanations, Boris Johnson should then politely remind Olaf Scholz that time is the most important thing Ukraine lacks. The atrocities

already committed in Bucha and other towns in the liberated Kyiv oblast are being replicated, probably on a much larger scale, in Mariupol, Kherson and other cities in the eastern and

southern regions. It should not be necessary to spell out to a German statesman what that means. President Zelensky told the Bundestag nearly a month ago that their solemn pledge that Europe

must “never again” allow crimes against humanity had been shown to be “worthless”. Now Zelensky says that it in many liberated Ukrainian villages “the occupiers did things that the locals

had not seen even during the Nazi occupation 80 years ago”. History, Boris Johnson should say, is not an excuse for Germany to do less than others for Ukraine, but a unique obligation to do

more. Europe’s largest economy, until recently Russia’s biggest trading partner, carries more weight in Moscow than any other country, even the United States. Many German firms have pulled

out of Russia and stopped exporting there. Taking the car industry as an example, it took Volkswagen, BMW and Mercedes a while, but they have done far better than the French giant Renault,

which is still a major player in the Russian market. However, the German chemical and pharmaceutical industries are lagging behind: major conglomerates such as Henkel and Bayer are still

exporting to Russia, while the complementary medicine firm Bionorica, for example, does a third of its business there. There is no justification for this — and Scholz must be told as much.

The biggest problem is energy. Last year, Russia supplied Germany with 55 per cent of its gas, 34 per cent of its oil and 52 per cent of its coal. Robert Habeck, Scholz’s Green

Vice-Chancellor, has announced that German reliance on Russia will be phased out over two years, with oil imports cut in half by the summer. This is far too slow. Contrast this with

Lithuania, a much smaller, poorer and more vulnerable country, which has already stopped importing Russian energy. It can be done. Boris should be frank with Olaf: how bad do the atrocities

in Ukraine need to get before he and his coalition pull their fingers out? Germany has plenty of its own coal; it can also delay its exit from nuclear power. The companies that import

Russian gas and oil can be shamed into switching to other suppliers. What they (and other German firms still trading with Russia) are doing is war profiteering, neither more nor less. Yes,

an immediate German exit from Russia will push up energy prices for everyone, including the UK, as markets adjust. But is that a good reason for the Germans, of all nations, to drag their

feet? If anyone could pull the rug from under Putin, it is them. The last country to wreak havoc in Ukraine before Russia was Nazi Germany. So far, Zelensky has been too diplomatic to point

this out, but the Poles, for example, have no such inhibitions. Does Scholz want to go down in history as the Chancellor who undid all the work of his predecessors, notably his own personal

hero Willy Brandt, in restoring his country’s reputation in Central and Eastern Europe? If he stands by while fellow Europeans are massacred, he and his compatriots won’t be forgiven twice.

If the conversation between Boris and Olaf takes this turn, it could be uncomfortable for both sides. The PM must expect pushback, with his interlocutor making much of the nexus between

oligarchs and the City of London. Though there is more to do, the UK has sanctioned most of these oligarchs and led the push to exclude Russia from the international financial system. The

British have lost trade; Germans must expect to make sacrifices too. Importantly, the UK has not allowed its policy on Ukraine to be influenced by business lobbying. Nor should the Federal

Republic. Ukraine is the overwhelming priority for both countries, but there must be no anti-German animus in pointing out where we feel our partners could do more. Above all, Boris Johnson

must make clear his personal commitment to improving the British-German relationship. With goodwill on both sides, it could be even better than before Brexit. Olaf Scholz should leave London

in no doubt that the notion of any lingering prejudice against his compatriots on _der Insel_ (“the island”) is a myth. The only thing that might cause such resentment would be the

perception that Germany is not doing its bit for Ukraine. Scholz’s responsibility is unique, but so is his opportunity. Gestures matter. The world would take note if the British and German

heads of government were to fly to Ukraine and let Volodymyr Zelensky show them first hand what the Russians have done to his country. Boris should say: how about it, Olaf? A MESSAGE FROM

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