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It has been nearly four months since Russian forces invaded Ukraine. This week, the three most powerful men in the European Union finally visited Kyiv: Chancellor Scholz of Germany,

President Macron of France and Prime Minister Mario Draghi of Italy.   It was high time they went. Olaf Scholz had insisted that he would not visit the war-torn Ukrainian capital merely for

a “photo-op”, but all three EU leaders made the most of the symbolism for their domestic audiences. The European media has been filled with images of the triumvirate of EU leaders traversing

the Continent by train, chatting amiably (in English, _bien sur_) and meeting President Zelensky, their tailored suits contrasting with his trademark battle fatigues. In a token gesture to

the more directly endangered nations of central, eastern and northern Europe, President Iohannis of Romania (not a Slav, but a German-speaking Transylvanian Saxon) was also invited —a snub

to the Poles, whose humanitarian and military contributions to Ukraine have been heroic.   Pictures of Zelensky and Macron embracing will do the French President’s party no harm in Sunday’s

tight parliamentary elections. (As head of state, he is constitutionally barred from campaigning.)  Scholz will be glad of a bit of good publicity for a change, after months of pressure to

do more for Ukraine from his Green coalition partners and the opposition Christian Democrats. The former central banker Draghi, who leads a stopgap coalition of experts, has the hard-Right

Brothers of Italy, led by the glamourous Giorgia Meloni, snapping at his heels. All three leaders have reason to look tough and statesmanlike. Ukraine has done a lot for them — but what have

they done for Ukraine? Here, the answer is much murkier. On the diplomatic front, the troika brought Zelensky some positive news: an invitation to the forthcoming G7 summit and confirmation

that Ukraine will be accepted as a “candidate” for EU membership. But it can take decades for a candidate to be accepted (Turkey has been one since 2005, still with next to no prospect of

joining), and the three musketeers made no commitments at all about NATO membership. Meanwhile the former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has just openly questioned whether Ukraine will

still exist in a year or two. No wonder Zelensky looked underwhelmed by his visitors’ promises to do something. What he will have heard was: this year, next year, sometime, never. More

important was the news on sanctions. And here there was nothing new to say. In the first 100 days of the war, Putin raked in almost $100 billion from fossil fuel exports — and, despite China

and India snapping up Russian energy at a discount on world prices, Europe continues to be by far his biggest market. Promises of an EU oil embargo were scaled down to exclude  pipeline

fuel — a huge concession that was blamed on Hungary but from which Germany and other countries continue to benefit. The United States has just been obliged to extend its exemption of the EU

from severe penalties for breaking sanctions, on the basis that it is phasing out its energy dependency. But that process looks likely to stretch at least into next year. With energy prices

still at or near historic highs, Russia will be able to finance its war at its current rate of more than $800 million a day from these exports alone for the foreseeable future. The EU has

been equally lax in sanctions beyond the energy sector: European household names such as Lacoste, Armani and Benetton, plus thousands of smaller fashion houses, are still trading in Russia,

using subsidiaries, franchises and other loopholes. The oligarchs may be poorer, but they still enjoy their creature comforts from Europe’s luxury exporters. The most crucial issue is, of

course, arms exports. Macron took the opportunity of his visit to Kyiv to promise another six Caesar 155mm howitzers to add to the dozen already delivered. These are powerful weapons,

although French state broadcasters have exaggerated their impact on the war. But Ukraine has asked for 1,000 pieces of heavy artillery simply to even up the balance, which at present favours

the Russians by anything up to 20 to 1. The French Caesars (worth about €100 million) represent just one per cent of a single category on the Ukrainian shopping list. Scholz’s record is far

worse. Despite many promises, his government has so far delivered no heavy equipment at all. Grrmany, Italy and France have all supplied less military hardware than Poland, Norway, Estonia

and Latvia, all of which have much smaller economies than the EU’s big three. These facts are readily available. Ironically, a German think tank, the Kiel Institute for World Economy, has

been tracking all forms of support for Ukraine since the outset here . One table shows the gaps between weaponry promised and delivered. Unsurprisingly, the US leads by a country mile,

although by the most recent figures on June 7 it had promised twice as much as it had actually delivered (about €2 billion). Poland comes next, followed by the UK (€1 billion) and Canada.

But Germany, France and Italy trail far behind, having sent less than €250 million of military aid each. All these figures are dwarfed by the quantities of equipment that this war of

attrition is now consuming. The human cost is, of course, incomparably greater: every day, Ukraine is losing 100-200 soldiers killed and four or five times as many wounded, mostly to

artillery. They are dying for Europe; the least that Europe can do is to stop them being hopelessly outgunned.   We must hope that all this was aired in the private discussions between

Zelensky and his guests from Western Europe. Against these incontrovertible facts of life and death, however, is a new opinion poll from the Berlin-based European Council on Foreign

Relations, which suggests that across most of Europe, a plurality of voters believe that Ukraine should give up territory in return for peace. Overall, the “peace” camp outnumbers the

“justice” camp by 35 to 22 per cent. The only exceptions are in Britain, where the numbers are delicately balanced between those who prioritise peace (22 per cent) and justice (21 per cent),

and in Poland, where 41 per cent favour punishing the Russians. The poll did not include most of central and eastern Europe but its most striking result was in the big three: 52 per cent of

Italians, 49 per cent of Germans and 41 per cent of the French favour giving Putin the land he demands. While Zelensky can hardly be expected to agree to his country’s dismemberment, he

will have been left in little doubt by Macron, Scholz and Draghi that public opinion in their back yards is demanding a ceasefire, even if that means perpetuating the occupation of a fifth

of his country. It is a bitter message, rendered no less unpalatable by the verbal support offered by the European trio. Macron may tell Zelensky that he wants Ukraine to win the war —

Scholz does not even go that far — but his actions belie his words. All three of these leaders have spoken at length to Putin in recent weeks; we do not know precisely what was said, but it

is unlikely to have been as uncompromising as the one for the cameras in Kyiv this week. As in the Second World War and the Cold War, it is the English-speaking peoples on whom the liberty

of Europe depends. The US, the UK and Canada will stand by Ukraine for as long as it takes to win this war, whatever the siren voices from Paris, Berlin and Rome may say. A MESSAGE FROM

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