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Penny Mordaunt is probably only just beginning to appreciate the scale of the challenges she faces at the Ministry of Defence, a panoply of issues her predecessor’s self-aggrandising

temporarily concealed. His blueprint for the future, December’s “Modernising Defence Programme” was — like the man himself — thinly spread, and bulked out with hyperbole about past

activities. Gavin Williamson was nothing if not an excellent self-publicist. He was somewhat successful in portraying himself to the media as the forces’ champion: as tough in his fights

with the Treasury over funding as he was in his stance over China. The reality is somewhat different. Beneath the headlines, the MoD faces a range of challenges, some new, some long

standing. Most important among these is the realignment of international politics. Five years ago, most commentators were openly scornful of the idea that Russia’s invasion of the Crimea

would prove durable. Many naively suggested that Russia’s economy would implode and Putin’s leadership crumble with it. The reality is far worse. Russia is conducting out of area of

operations in Syria and has now Venezuela — threatening America’s backyard. America and NATO’s inability to stop Russian action is a litmus of the current weakness of Western power and

political inertia. The threat from Russia is also no longer confined to conventional military action. As the Mueller investigation and other incidents have revealed, the West is effectively

in a continual low intensity conflict with Russia. The battlefield is no longer physical, but it is assault on Western democracy itself — and it largely takes place in cyberspace. Western

governments, including Theresa May’s, have still not managed to reconceptualise their response to the threat. Because Russia’s tactics involve a sophisticated and pervasive undermining of

truth and confidence in civil society via social media, the response cannot be limited to simply deploying more cyber specialists. More thought has to be given to exactly how one defends

liberal democratic values and the disruption of their practice. John Bolton’s recent comments on Venezuela told us everything about how the US now views the World and her role in it. “This

is our hemisphere. It’s not where the Russians ought to be interfering.” His statement was a return to the 19 th century Monroe Doctrine and reverses several generations of American foreign

policy. If Latin America belongs to the US sphere of influence, it suggests that Russia has a legitimate sphere of influence, too, somewhere (unstated) within Europe. The threat does not

just stem from Russia. As American power declines, Mordaunt must also address the rise of China and the spread of her military capability in support of the ambitious “Belt and Road” plan.

Equally, the Middle East is slowly realigning as the relevance of American power recedes. Even for old American allies such as Israel, regional alliances and the emergence of Russia in the

region are starting to supplant the US. The details of how America views the exercise of her power will matter a great deal to the new Defence Secretary. The special relationship, whatever

its current state of health, is no longer the guarantor of Britain’s global interests. Once Brexit is completed, Britain will be more reliant on Nato, at a moment when America sees Europe as

no longer an integral part of her sphere of influence. This means that the most pressing issue Mordaunt faces is maintaining and deepening defence cooperation with mainland Europe, even

whilst we leave the EU. Nato simply does not represent the cast-iron guarantee of American security that it once did. This reality has not yet filtered through fully to the armed forces, the

whole of post-war military doctrine has been based on these previously inviolable truths. Our military no longer has the capability to carry out full-spectrum operations across all the

dimensions of battlespace. We are reliant on our allies for much of our capability. Mordaunt’s primary task should be to foster an entirely new way of envisaging UK security and defence. The

Huawei debate that unseated her predecessor shows some of the dynamics at play in this new multi polar world. There is a legitimate debate to be had about the trade-off between using

Chinese technology, with the associated risks of surveillance, or using less advanced and more expensive European technology. The debate revealed the short-sightedness of the UK’s defence

industrial strategy. Lord Drayson highlighted the vulnerabilities in 2005, but few measures were taken then to avoid this type of situation occurring. The idea that the important components

of an emergent technology should be dependent on a potential adversary seems extraordinary. The new Defence Secretary learly needs to implement a new defence industrial strategy that avoids

this situation being repeated in an increasingly technology-orientated battlespace, where the demarcation between the civilian and military spheres is increasingly blurred. In addition to

these new challenges, the armed forces still face perennial issues of manpower and funding. Although Williamson secured some extra funding from the Treasury, this was largely to offset the

depreciation of sterling and rising costs of “Dreadnought”, the successor to the Trident nuclear deterrent. Like so much else in government, the future of defence spending will be dependent

on the Comprehensive Spending Review, which will itself be affected by the outcome of Brexit negotiations. If Brexit has negative economic consequences even in the short term, it seems

likely that defence will lose out to areas such as health and social security. It is hard to imagine how the current defence programme or any form of expansion could be funded in the

circumstances. The MoD faces a Catch-22 because insufficient funding means a piecemeal approach to expensive capital projects, which in turn pushes them further above budget and over time.

The Public Accounts Committee has already identified a £7 billion funding gap, which could double over the next 10 years. The Dreadnought  programme has received additional funding to make

sure it is sufficiently funded at a cost-effective pace. But other over-budget projects remain, such as the hugely expensive F-35 jet. With 138 aircraft due to be delivered, there is only

certainty over the procurement of the first 48 of these. The armed forces’ conventional capability is already starting to suffer as they face the biggest staffing shortfall for a decade. The

number of regulars was 5.7 per cent short in 2018, with specific areas such as intelligence analysts facing 26 per cent shortfalls. The MoD is struggling to meet pay awards in order to

remain even minimally competitive as an employer. The government is committed to spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence beyond 2019/20. Short of a major conflict it seems unlikely that this

figure would increase. As the Public Accounts Committee noted, the MoD is a repeat offender. In the words of Meg Hillier, Committee Chair: “The MoD simply cannot afford everything it says it

needs and it is not acceptable for officials to continue deferring decisions that have a bearing on its current affordability gap and longer-term risks.” Penny Mordaunt has the unenviable

task, not only of balancing the books to meet current strategic necessities, but to plan simultaneously for the most uncertain geopolitical environment in living memory. She cannot afford to

wait for the outcome of Brexit to make these decisions. If she does, Britain’s security will be the casualty.