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The US-backed Syrian Defence Force has declared the five-year rule of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) caliphate over, with the fall of its last stronghold at Baghuz. At its

height, the self-proclaimed state ruled 34,000 square miles of both Syrian and Iraqi territory, levied taxes, maintained an Islamic-based welfare system and provided a physical and spiritual

focus for jihadis on a global basis. It is clear that this edition of the ISIS caliphate has ended, but it is likely that it will simply change its form rather than disappear completely

from the political and religious landscape of the Middle East, and beyond. As the ISIS leadership contemplates its future, what lessons will it take from this, a tactical failure, in order

to inform its long-term ambition, strategic success? The first might be the weight it continues to give to its claim to be a caliphate in the great tradition of the Islamic Golden Age. The

caliph is the successor to Mohammed on Earth; different interpretations of the role split early Islam and created the Sunni/Shia schism that lies at the heart of the confessional conflict

within the belief system right up to the present day. There is a strand within Islamic jurisprudence that believes the only legitimate caliphate ended in 1258 with the fall of the Abbasid

Dynasty to the invading Mongols and that its Mamluk and Ottoman successors were pale and profane imitations of the highest religious vocation with Islam. Taken against this background, the

appointment in 2014 by the ISIS Shura council of Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri (aka Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) to caliph was an act of breathtaking historical and religious presumption. The

assumed name of Abu Bakr is taken from one of the Prophet’s companions and is at the same time a knowing reference and evidence of the scale of al-Baghdadi’s pretension. Taking a crude

comparison, it was the approximate equivalent of the Army Council of the Provisional IRA at the height of The Troubles in Northern Ireland appointing Martin McGuinness as Pope and renaming

him Peter. The author exaggerates for effect, but it interesting how little the West, Shia Islam or the more conservative elements within Sunni Islam have pointed up the sacrilegious lese

majesty of ISIS’s claims. If this establishes the religious credentials of ISIS then it is little wonder that some of its European volunteers carried copies of _Islam for Dummies _as they

travelled to the new caliphate. We need not be detained by a theological debate but even this fleeting review places ISIS, at best, at the margins of religious legitimacy and, at worst, as

the object of derision. With this manifesto, it is unsurprising how much it has attracted foreigners, converts and the criminally marginalised, and, until it repositions itself or plays down

its messianic claims, it will never engage with the mainstream of Sunni Islam – a precondition of longer-term strategic success. The creation of a geographical entity called the caliphate

has acted as an inspiration to a generation of disillusioned Muslims; it also provided the map co-ordinates for the Western air campaign. In giving the caliphate material form, ISIS

guaranteed its destruction against the overwhelming conventional military strength that would inevitably be deployed against it, once it became a definable target. How did ISIS come to make

this fundamental error when its great advantage lay in its ability to engage its conventional enemies asymmetrically? What this means is that relatively weaker forces can successfully engage

relatively stronger forces so long as they avoid battle on conventional terms, remain agile and retain the ability to disappear back into a wider community – or, as it has become to be

known, conduct _War Amongst the People. _This process is exactly the approach that al-Qaeda in Iraq, the forerunner to ISIS, took against US-led coalition forces after the invasion of Iraq.

After the bulk of US forces had withdrawn and with a run of success against the Iraqi army, culminating in the fall of Mosul in 2014, it may be that ISIS became overconfident and felt it had

moved into the realms of symmetrical engagement against an equivalent force in what amounted to inter-state warfare. The natural corollary to this was the creation of a state – the

caliphate – to reflect a new strategic reality. Unfortunately for ISIS, asymmetric engagement works both ways and the West immediately saw the opportunity to bring the overwhelming strength

provided by air power, Special Forces, terminally guided missiles and field artillery against weaker ISIS forces. The campaign fought against the ISIS caliphate turns out to have been a

complete vindication of the theory of asymmetric force, but not of agile weakness against ponderous strength; instead, overwhelming strength has decisively trumped relative strength. It

represents evidence of hubris and is a mistake ISIS is unlikely to make again. The headlines of statehood – sovereignty, identity and self-determination – are matters of pride and display,

but the everyday details – raising taxes and running the dog pound – are simply tiresome. For an organisation like ISIS, that seeks to create a galvanising, revolutionary effect, being

preoccupied with petty administration concentrates attention on the prosaic, when it should aspire to the inspirational. It also removes civil disobedience from the armoury of insurgency. As

the Kosovan Albanians showed, routine acts of disruption in everyday life can invite a disproportionate response and set the conditions for _War Amongst the People. _The minute ISIS owned

the process of civil administration it became the object of the dissatisfaction that would, otherwise, have been directed against an oppressive, dysfunctional state. Again, the benefits of

the premature assumption of statehood are much exaggerated. There are other things that ISIS got wrong – like lethal violence becoming an instrument of governance – but the two issues that

stand out are the bogus claims of religious authority and getting ahead of itself in creating a state: failures in both the sacred and the secular realm. As the ISIS operations officer

begins to write his after action report we can anticipate his conclusions: keep it simple, blend back into the people, take the fight to the enemy and don’t bring him to us, secure

asymmetrical advantage, prepare to move on to the next phase. ISIS won’t make the same mistakes again.