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Was Theresa May responsible for the catastrophic Brexit negotiations or was she badly served by civil servants? As a Cabinet minister, I was often asked whether _Yes Minister_ accurately

describes the relationship between ministers and their officials. The smart reply was: you think it’s a comedy — we know it’s a documentary!    In fact, it only describes what happens to a

minister like Jim Hacker who has no clear agenda, but just reacts to this morning’s headlines, tries to get a good press tomorrow and careers all over the place. Then the Civil Service takes

over. And a good thing too. It is better to have consistent government than a random walk. The Department usually substitutes its default agenda and resists any changes proposed by the

politician. But if a minister has a clear agenda (however distasteful to officials) and is determined to push ahead, then in my experience the Civil Service will row in and help achieve

those objectives.     Of course, Brexit is far more momentous than anything facing a departmental minister.  It required the most radical change this country has seen since we joined the EU.

But, in Nigel Lawson’s words, “the Civil Service doesn’t do radical”. Moreover, the bulk of the Civil Service were deeply committed to Remain and aghast at the outcome of the Referendum. So

even a strong, experienced and committed Brexiteer Prime Minister, with a clear agenda for implementing Brexit, would have required immense political will, backed by her key Cabinet

ministers, to overcome Civil Service inertia and hostility and carry Brexit through successfully.    I don’t wish to speak ill of the departing, but Mrs May had none of those attributes. On

the contrary: her very unusual personality seemed to make her uniquely open to being managed by her officials, rather than vice versa.  As far as one can, tell she has no particular agenda

of her own — not just on Brexit, but on anything. That vacuum has usually been filled by a handful of opinionated people close to her. Those people are invariably employees (like her special

advisers) or officials — never her political peers who could be potential rivals.   She rarely talks to, or confides in, her cabinet ministers or fellow MPs. When I told a journalist

writing a profile of her that in 20 years together in the House of Commons we had probably exchanged 200 words, he replied: “So you were one of her closest friends!” I hope it is not too

unkind to say that no previous Prime Minister has so closely resembled a ventriloquist’s dummy.  Between becoming PM (by default when all four other candidates imploded) and the 2017

election, she mouthed the words of Nick Timothy: the commitments to leave the Customs Union and Single Market, and “a bad deal is worse than no deal”. Following the bungled 2017 general

election campaign, Timothy and Co had to go.   Since the election the words have been those of her political secretary, Gavin Barwell, and of officials like Ollie Robbins and the Head of the

Civil Service, Mark Sedwill — who had been 2nd and 1st Permanent Secretaries at the Home Office when Mrs May was Home Secretary. Ultimately, Ministers are responsible for the advisors they

appoint and the advice they take.   If a Prime Minister has no personal agenda, the officials on whom she relies cannot be criticised for filling that vacuum.    But do they have the right

to fill it with policies which reflect their own prejudices, and contradict both the manifesto on which the Government was elected and the referendum which secured the largest popular vote

in British history?   And is that what has happened? Soon after Brexit a former Cabinet Secretary reportedly said: “Don’t worry, we will strangle Brexit at birth”. And that appears to be

happening. From the beginning, some parts of the government machine seem to have been working to present Parliament with a choice between Brexit in Name Only (BRINO) and remaining in the EU.

That has meant keeping the UK in the Customs Union and subject to Single Market law, despite the manifesto commitments to leave. Since this was nearer the EU’s objective than the British

government’s, many of our officials have been negotiating to change the British position rather than that of the EU. Once they abandoned the option of leaving with ‘no deal’ they forfeited

any leverage with the EU. Certainly, they have adopted a far more intransigent line with Parliament than with the EU –as Ollie Robbins’ remarks in a Brussels bar revealed. The only trading

relationship compatible with the manifesto commitment to leave the customs union and single market is a free trade agreement. President Tusk explicitly recognised that when he offered the UK

such an agreement – yet his offer was ignored. David Davis likewise wanted a UK/EU free trade agreement and drafted a treaty. Then at Chequers, Ollie Robbins produced another scheme,

prepared behind his back, which was a customs union in all but name. Ministers were not given time to study or discuss it with advisers – making a mockery of cabinet government. Initially,

both HMRC and the Irish Customs said they could manage the border without infrastructure or checks at the border. Only after Varadkar became Taoiseach did Ireland and the EU claim that laws

and tariffs must remain the same either side of the border to avoid border checks. Instead of sticking to our position that “we do not … require any infrastructure at the border between

Northern Ireland and Ireland under any circumstances” the UK side seized on the EU demand as an excuse to stay in the Customs Union and subject to single market laws. It was an excuse, not a

reason. Now Ireland and the EU have reaffirmed that, in the event of ‘no deal’ they will not have checks or infrastructure at the border, the case for the Backstop is destroyed. But so much

has been conceded that it will be difficult for May’s successor to retrieve the position. Before facing up to the EU a new PM will have to reassert their authority over officials who have

got used to pursuing their own agenda.