Reader TTS

Bomber Command really had no choice. Its strategy in the Second World War had been to mount precision daylight raids, using the tactic of deploying multi-turreted medium bombers in a tight

formation, such that attacking interceptors would be met with a hail of supporting fire from multiple directions. The tactic lasted until the aerial Battle of Heligoland Bight two-and-a-half

months after war was declared in September 1939, when a force of Wellingtons was mauled by Messerschmitt 109s and 110s, losing a third of their number. Such losses were unsustainable, and

Bomber Command decided to switch to night bombing. The problem was that if enemy terrain was subject to a blackout, that it would be almost impossible to locate precisely a target smaller

than a town. Eventually area bombing gained legitimacy as “de-housing”. During the 6-year conflict, Bomber Command only mounted two precision night raids, both in 1943. The first was the

legendary Dam Busters raid, which saw a 45% loss rate, and the second was the raid on the secret weapon facilities at Peenemünde, where the loss rate was just 6%. That was because there was

a diversionary raid by Mosquitos on Berlin, which duped the Luftwaffe’s night fighter force, so it only managed to attack the third wave of the bombers’ attack. Other than that, night raids

were indiscriminate in their obliteration of towns and destruction of city quarters. Bombers attacked according to the position of marker flares, and on the instructions of Master Bombers or

Controllers, _in situ _attack coordinators that orbited the attack zone. It was while he was doing this work over Bremen in a Mosquito that the Dams raid leader Guy Gibson VC, DSO, DFC was

shot down and killed in September 1944. Such was the scale of the devastation of Germany that Bomber Command stood down almost a month before VE-Day because the RAF had run out of targets to

obliterate. While the Area Bombing strategy was subject to strong criticism after the war, such that no separate battle honour was awarded to Bomber Command, and no memorial to the

aircrews’ work erected until 2012, no-one has ever proposed an alternative strategy in response to the Germans bombing towns and cities across the continent. Nothing has ever been suggested

as a replacement for Germany “reaping the whirlwind”. However, indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets as a military strategy has been increasingly unacceptable in the West. This was

epitomised by the napalm attack on 9-year-old Phan Thi Kim Phuc’s village by American planes during the Vietnam War. The resultant footage of her running naked with her skin burnt off was

the death-knell for American ambitions in Indo-China. Phan Thi Kim Phuc, now 59 years old, has only in the last few weeks received her final skin graft for the injuries she received

half-a-century ago. The need to avoid what is blandly described as “collateral damage” was one of the drivers for precision-guided munitions, the much-vaunted “smart bombs” that made their

global public debut during Operation Desert Storm in Iraq in 1991. Since then, developments in microelectronics have vastly increased the precision of weapons such that just two small

missiles were in 2020 used to destroy a pair of cars, one of which was transporting Iran’s terrorist-in-chief Qasem Soleimani. Other developments include a missile with no explosive warhead,

but instead sprouts six blades umbrella-fashion to impale and slice its victim without killing others, something that is only possible with precision guidance. It is in this context of

precision guidance that the missile attacks on civilian areas by Vladimir Putin should be considered. Despite the Western embargo on microelectronics, it is inconceivable that Putin’s armed

forces have been so technologically degraded that they are now fighting a 21st-century war using 1950s technology. Unless the Russian armed forces are considerably more incompetent than all

the visual evidence presented up to now, it is only possible to assume that the missile attacks on a crowded shopping centre, and a block of flats, were deliberate. After all, Russian

missiles have been successful in destroying arms dumps in Western Ukraine, so there is no good reason why their aim should suddenly be so off target. But why deliberately attack civilians?

This may be a sign of desperation. There are parallels with these attacks and Saddam Hussein’s Scud missile bombardment of Israel during the 1991 Desert Storm aerial campaign. Israel was not

part of the coalition to liberate Kuwait, as this would have angered the other Arab member states. What Saddam was hoping for was an Israeli retaliation in the form of a missile strike

against Iraq. If Israel had made war on Saddam, this would have fractured the coalition and hampered Anglo-American operations. And this may explain what Putin is up to. Ukraine has started

to use American-supplied HIMARS rocket launchers, which have state-of-the-art precision guidance. The missiles have hit targets such as Russian munitions stores and field headquarters, in

the latter case adding to the death-toll of senior Russian officers. However, the flow of such precision munitions might dry up completely if a Ukrainian commander were to decide to take

revenge by launching a missile at a town just over the border in Russia, killing Russian civilians. Rather like Saddam, Putin is trying to provoke a reaction, but in this case to stem the

flow of Western arms that are being used to outfight his forces. While the Russians may have numerical military superiority, this merely presents more targets for the Ukrainians to hit with

their precision weapons. The war on Ukraine’s Eastern Front has become quite static and attritional. While Ukraine is ceding ground, every Russian gain has been costly, and the rate of loss

for Russia may not be sustainable. Making war on Ukraine at the wrong time of year to commence ground operations suggests Putin was desperate and could not wait for terrain conditions to

improve when this would also mean Ukraine would have more Western weapons and also troops trained in how to use them. Deliberate attacks on civilians suggest that all is still not well in

the Kremlin, if these attacks are seen as a necessary use of what seems to be a declining military force. Blowing up civilians with missile attacks is strategically pointless and as much a

waste of weapons and effort as were Hitler’s V1 and V2 campaigns in 1944-45 (the V2 by some estimates cost Germany more than the Manhattan Project cost the USA). They are a sign that Putin

knows he is losing, so he seems to now be acting as if he has nothing further to lose. A MESSAGE FROM THEARTICLE _We are the only publication that’s committed to covering every angle. We

have an important contribution to make, one that’s needed now more than ever, and we need your help to continue publishing throughout the pandemic. So please, make a donation._