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While recent headlines have largely centred on India’s external conflict with Pakistan, a quieter yet enduring anti-insurgency operation may be nearing a decisive turning point within India.

Earlier this month, the death of a top Maoist commander, signalled a possible endgame in the country’s decades-long anti-insurgency campaign. New Delhi’s fight against Left-Wing Extremism

(LWE), commonly known as Naxalism or the Maoist insurgency, has stretched over five decades and spanned multiple governments. The central government’s recent pledge to eliminate the Maoist

threat by 31 March 2026 reflects both an ambitious target and growing confidence within its security and political circles of achieving the deadline. Such confidence has also been heavily

inspired by the recent high operational success of eliminating CPI (Maoist) Supreme Commander, Basava Raju. Officials believe Raju’s elimi nation has created a leadership vacuum within

Maoist ranks, potentially triggering internal disarray and a dip in overall morale for the movement. The operation is also being hailed as a milestone in India’s campaign to dismantle LWE,

which has undoubtedly shifted the balance in favour of Indian security forces in several of the most affected regions. Advertisement The Maoist movement traces its origins to the late 1960s

uprising in Naxalbari, West Bengal, a radical left uprising that sought to rectify perceived social and economic injustices. Over the years, it spread across central and eastern Indian

states, evolving into a violent insurgency that has repeatedly challenged state authority, targeted security forces, stalled development projects and claimed an estimated 8,800 civilian

lives in the past decade alone. Despite intermittent crackdowns in the 1970s and 1980s, the insurgency gained operational momentum in the early 2000s, with the formal merger of Maoist

factions under the Communist Party of India (Maoist). Advertisement At its peak, the insurgency operated in over 100 districts, employing guerrilla warfare tactics, ambushes and targeted

assassinations, while simultaneously embedding itself within local social structures. Some of the most violent chapters in this insurgency have involved high-profile political assassinations

and attacks on security forces. A major turning point was the 2013 killing of Mahendra Karma and others, a prominent anti-Naxal leader and the architect of Salwa Judum ~ a controversial

state-backed militia that armed local villagers to resist Maoists. While Salwa Judum was framed as a grassroots counter insurgency initiative, it quickly drew criticism from the Supreme

Court of India, which declared it unconstitutional. In the decade since, New Delhi has moved toward a more coordinated, centralized counterinsurgency strategy. This has included enhanced

troop deployments, improved intelligence-sharing mechanisms, investments in rural infrastructure, and the use of advanced surveillance technologies. Officials cite the declining frequency

and geographical spread of Maoist attacks as evidence of this strategy’s effectiveness. Since 2015, the National Policy and Action Plan has guided these efforts, focusing on strengthening

security infrastructure, building roads, and launching welfare schemes in Naxal-affected areas. A defining feature of the current phase has been Operation Kagar, launched in January 2024

with the objective of eliminating Naxalism by March 2026, a goal reiterated by Union Home Minister Amit Shah. This large-scale offensive has mobilized around 10,000 Central Reserve Police

Force (CRPF) commandos, including specialized units like the CRPF’s CoBRA, the District Reserve Guard and other elite units, to target Maoist strongholds across multiple Indian states.

According to government data, LWE is now confined to just 38 districts, down from over 100 in 2014. Since the beginning of 2025, more than 300 Maoists have been killed, and over 800 have

surrendered under the pressure of sustained operations such as Kagar. Earlier this month, security forces achieved a major breakthrough by killing Nambala Keshava Rao, known as Basava Raju,

the Supreme Commander of the CPI (Maoist). Raju was not only the group’s ideological head and top strategist but also the key link between its northern and southern commands. His death,

along with 26 other Mao ists in a 50-hour operation in Chhattisgarh’s Abujhmad, is being seen as a significant tactical and psychological blow to the movement. Raju’s unique position atop

the Maoist hierarchy made him both the chief architect of the group’s violent tactics and the strategist behind its broader political vision. He is believed to have orchestrated several of

the deadliest attacks against Indian security forces, including the 2010 Dantewada massacre and the 2013 Darbha Valley ambush that claimed the life of Mahendra Karma. His deep grasp of

jungle warfare and psychological operations enabled the Maoists to repeatedly evade large-scale security sweeps and sustain their campaign over decades. With his death, the insurgency has

lost not only its top commander but also its principal military mind and the architect of its long-term survival strategies. The Maoist movement in India, while clandestine, operates through

a highly centralized command structure, and Raju’s elimination may very well disrupt this hierarchy at a critical moment, potentially undermining the group’s capacity to plan and execute

coordinated attacks. Therefore, the operation that killed Basava Raju is being portrayed as a clear sign that the endgame is within reach. The 2026 deadline to eliminate the insurgency also

carries significant political and national security weight much due to its prolonged effects over multiple states in India. Yet, this framing has not been without critique. The killing has

also drawn criticism from some quarters of political parties in the Left, who argue that such operations bypass due process and further alienate local populations. The government on the

other hand has maintained that such operations have been intelligence-based and necessary due to the violence that the insurgency has inflicted in the affected regions. New Delhi’s fight

against left-wing extremism nonetheless stands at a critical juncture. With violence at a historic low, Maoist influence is now largely confined to a handful of districts, and with security

operations achieving unprecedented precision, the government’s ambitious goal of a Naxal-free India by March 2026 appears somewhat attainable. However, even if New Delhi meets its

operational targets, the true test of the state’s counterinsurgency strategy will lie in what follows. Security victories, while crucial, risk being short-lived if not complemented with

sustained governance outreach, robust rehabilitation policies, and genuine empowerment of local communities. The government’s multipronged approach of blending security operations,

infrastructure expansion, and rights based development has delivered transformative results in many regions. Yet, consolidating these gains will require unwavering political will, inclusive

development, and continued efforts to win the trust of the Adivasi communities that have been affected the most by the conflict. Only by addressing the root causes that gave rise to

left-wing extremism can India ensure that the current operational successes translate into lasting peace and stability in the region (The writer is Senior Research Associate, Organisation

for Research on China and Asia) Advertisement