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One year ago, the most consistent adjectives describing the Private Military Company known as the Wagner Group and its leader Yevgenny Prighozhin were “shadowy,” “obscure,” and “secretive.”

Now, they have a building in their name in St Petersburg and have played prominent roles in the fall of Soledar and the ongoing battle for Bakhmut. Western intelligence estimates the group

has some 50,000 fighters in Russia and Ukraine and several thousand operating abroad. Wagner’s rise mirrors the Iranian-backed Islamist terror group Hezbollah. Once a faction of disaffected

Shia Muslims in Lebanon’s Civil War, Hezbollah has become a shadow state with international capabilities. How Wagner evolves in the coming years has major implications for international

security. Studying Hezbollah helps us understand what factors may work in Wagner’s favour and will help develop a countering strategy. The first essential factor is state backing.

Originally, Hezbollah was a fringe umbrella movement, whose name “Party of God” was considered a joke by locals. Within a year of Tehran’s agents establishing contact, the group conducted

the 1983 Beirut Barracks Bombing, which led to the US withdrawal from Lebanon. Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, has acknowledged the importance of Tehran to the group’s longevity, but

the relationship is symbiotic. Tehran gains influence in Lebanon and globally through Hezbollah’s networks, allowing it to threaten Israeli interests. Wagner possessed state support even

before the invasion of Ukraine. Key members have Russian Military Intelligence backgrounds – a profession that Putin claims no member leaves. Prighozhin states that his directives come from

“Papa” (Putin); defectors divulge the intelligence and logistical support they received from the Kremlin. In return, the Kremlin gains influence across Africa and the Middle East; this

translates into diplomatic and narrative clout for minimal investment. The fact that Wagner’s influence has been cited as a factor in some states’ positions on Ukraine indicates that the

Kremlin is almost certain to continue these operations. The second factor is freedom of manoeuvre. Hezbollah has demonstrated the ability to maintain a fluid network from the Middle East to

South America, despite being a proscribed terror group. Wagner has even greater freedom of manoeuvre. Despite its reputation and recent labelling as a transnational criminal group, it

remains protected by the Kremlin and employed by governments in the Middle East and Africa. It’s also unclear where mercenaries fit in terms of accountability and international law: they are

neither civilians nor lawful combatants. By operating in this state-backed grey zone, rather than outright illegality like Hezbollah, Wagner has a layer of protection that enhances its

freedom of manoeuvre. The third and last factor is a vacuum in which they can thrive. Hezbollah’s breakthrough moment came when it entered the Syrian Civil War in 2013. Prior to this, they

were the junior partner in the “Axis of resistance” (Hezbollah, Tehran and Assad). But their numbers and experience in urban fighting soon made them indispensable to Assad’s reclamation of

territory. Now the roles are reversed: Assad is the junior partner while Hezbollah has expanded its territory into Syria, achieving strategic depth against Israel and influence over

drug-trafficking routes to the Gulf. Similarly, Wagner and Prighozhin already possess a significant role in the Kremlin’s influence activities abroad. Now that the Kremlin needs expendable

forces in Ukraine and diplomatic support from Africa, Wagner’s role – and Prighozhin’s financial influence – could expand with greater autonomy. These factors are not specific to Hezbollah.

Mercenary groups across history have become major powers in the same way. Examples include Attila and the Huns; the Normans in Byzantium; the Condottieri of Renaissance Italy. Hezbollah

demonstrates the zenith of what Wagner could achieve in the contemporary era. The flags of Hezbollah (Shutterstock) However, the Wagner Group faces obstacles. Firstly, Wagner has become

increasingly overt in its activities. Increased exposure brings advantages in contracts abroad and increased favour with the Kremlin, but also means increased international pressure and

increased expectations from their backers, especially as Prighozhin’s open criticism of the Russian defence establishment has made him and his group many enemies. This ties in with a second

obstacle: Wagner’s potential threat to the Kremlin. Putin and his inner circle have spent two decades creating a system that makes its members highly dependent on their favour, as well as

basing their legitimacy on the imposition of “law and order” after the anarchy following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Wagner could threaten that system. Hezbollah poses no threat to

Tehran on Iranian soil; this is not the case for Wagner. Prighozhin is unlikely to launch a coup, but the existence of a successful, unaccountable, heavily armed militia increases the

likelihood of copycats and violent infighting. Meanwhile, the release of large numbers of convicts into society who earned their freedom fighting for Wagner risks returning Russia to the

crime-ridden chaos of the 1990s, undermining the Kremlin’s legitimacy. For this reason, it is likely that Wagner will be kept on a tight leash. Wagner remains highly dependent on the Russian

military’s resources. Consequently, its ability to develop will be subject to the Kremlin’s will. By contrast, Hezbollah maintains enough of its own funding so that Tehran withdrawing

support would diminish, but not destroy them. Lastly, Wagner lacks an ideology to cultivate popular support. Hezbollah’s success has stemmed not just from force but from narrative appeal. It

continues to attract support from disaffected Shia with its “just revolution” messaging and overall religious culture. It also runs public services in Lebanon and maintains some popularity

as a “protector”, based on its “defeat” of Israel in 2006. While Wagner maintains links to far-right groups and espouses rabid nationalism, it has no discernible ideology that it can

articulate to a non-militant audience. Hezbollah’s warped vision is a struggle in service to God, appealing to Islamic faith on and off the battlefield. Wagner’s mission is the pursuit of

profit through violence, or at best  the freedom to continue committing the crimes that led you to enter its nihilistic system in the first place. This will make it harder for Wagner to

create popular appeal and move itself beyond the status of a paramilitary mercenary group. Flag of the Wagner Group These obstacles are not insurmountable, but they can be exploited to check

Wagner’s advance. Increasing informational output on the threat Wagner and Prighozhin pose to the Kremlin could foster infighting and military-bureaucratic opposition to providing Wagner

supplies. Providing consistent reporting to the Russian people about notable convicts that have been released due to their service with Wagner would promote domestic opposition to Wagner and

the Kremlin’s recruitment programme. This could include drawing historical parallels to the infamous Dirlewagner Brigade – a collection of violent criminals released by the Nazis to

undertake suicide missions and terrorise populations in return for their freedom. Their cruelty set a new bar even by Nazi standards. The similarities could elicit concerns of worst-case

scenarios among the Russian population and undermine the Kremlin’s pretensions of combating “Nazism” in Ukraine. If Wagner achieves Hezbollah’s capabilities, it will have significant

implications for international security. The group’s informational and mercenary operations are already fuelling instability in parts of Africa. It undermines bilateral engagements on

countering violent extremism and tackling climate change. Wagner’s continued framing of UN forces for massacres also poses a direct threat to peacekeeping missions everywhere. If Wagner

achieves a breakout, these activities will accelerate, and its network could expand to include its own proxy forces. In Europe, this creates the possibility of terror attacks from lone

actors trained by Wagner. In Russia, Wagner could violently compete with the establishment, moving this nuclear-armed country toward failed statehood. Regardless of Wagner achieving its full

potential, the group will remain a danger to international and Russian security. Putin claims to be an avid reader of history. If so, he would do well to remember Machiavelli’s view of

mercenaries: “[they] are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious, and without

discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for

in peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy.” A MESSAGE FROM THEARTICLE _We are the only publication that’s committed to covering every angle. We have an important contribution

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