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In Ukraine, the fight over Bakhmut continues. Russia’s Wagner Group has made some gains but after weeks of heavy fighting has not yet been able to take the city. Indeed, the Russian assault

on Ukraine has stalled, and while many anticipate a new Russian “spring” offensive, spring has come but not the offensive. On the other hand, Ukraine seems poised to recapture not only much

if not all of the territory it lost after the February 2021 Russian invasion, but much of Donetsk and Luhansk and indeed Mariupol and ultimately Crimea. The Ukrainian army is more than

holding its own, thanks both to the equipment it is receiving in ever greater numbers, and to the training that the United States and contributing nations are providing to its troops.

Germany’s first shipment of 18 Leopard 2A6 tanks, together with ammunition, spare parts and two armored recovery vehicles arrived in Ukraine in late March and were immediately deployed in

the field. The first British Challenger 2 Main Battle tanks arrived at almost the same time. The tanks were only the latest of a long list of increasingly lethal systems that the

contributing nations have been supplying to the Ukrainian military. The contributing nations are providing Kyiv with more powerful air defense systems. The first of three Patriot missile

batteries, one each from the United States, Germany and the Netherlands, arrived in early March. Similarly, Ukraine has taken possession of more than twenty High Mobility Artillery Rocket

Systems (HIMARS) that can fire satellite guided rockets to a distance of fifty miles. In addition, Britain has announced that it will transfer Shadow Strike long-range air launched missiles

to Ukraine, while the contributing states continue to provide the Ukrainians with artillery shells that became the staple of the winter phase of the war. With the Russians having constructed

trenches to stabilize their positions throughout eastern and southern Ukraine, it is Ukrainian artillery that has magnified the cost of any Russian advances. On the other hand, the

Ukrainians have not limited themselves to attacking targets inside their territory. They have also hit targets in Russia, though they have avoided doing so with American-supplied systems.

Moreover, numerous countries have been training the Ukrainians, both for manning individual systems and for combined arms operations, of which the newly arrived tanks will be a critical

component.  For example, the United States and Germany have teamed up to train some 4,000 troops in two brigades that would respectively operate Bradleys and Strykers as part of combined

arms operations.  Some 15,000 Ukrainians have already received training in one or another of the contributing states that are providing material to Kyiv; the United States alone has trained

7,000 of them. Meanwhile the Russians are struggling.  Moscow continues to receive Iranian drones, North Korean artillery, and various forms of Chinese subterranean support. But none of

these sources of supply come close to matching what Kyiv’s allies have delivered to its military.  Moreover, having replaced his top commander three times in the past year, Putin appears to

have engaged in a second round of dismissals; reports indicate that Lieutenant General Sergei Kuzmenko, who has never served as a military district commander, will replace Colonel General

Rustam Muradov as Eastern Military District (EMD) commander. Muradov had failed to achieve any success in the Donetsk oblast—which incorporates one of the Russian areas that had declared

“independence” from Ukraine. It is not at all clear that Kuzmenko will fare any better, however, since the army’s inherent problems have not changed. Unit cohesion is problematical, morale

remains low and Russian losses continue to accumulate. Meanwhile, whereas there has yet to be a Russian offensive, the Ukrainians appear to be preparing for a spring offensive of their own,

buoyed by the influx of material and continuing accretion of trained personnel. How far the Ukrainians might advance is of course very much an open question. President Volodymir Zelensky

wants to roll back all Russians gains since 2014, which therefore includes Crimea as well as the four Donbas oblasts. Given comparative Russian and Ukrainian military performance to date, a

Ukrainian attack to retake Crimea cannot entirely be ruled out. Vladimir Putin may still have Odessa and the entire Ukrainian Black Sea littoral in his sights, but Zelensky has his own eyes

on Crimea and its major port of Sevastopol. The city has a major place in Russian history. Catherine the Great conquered Crimea in 1783 and that year Prince Potemkin founded the Black Sea

fleet together with Sevastopol, its principal base. Crimea has been the key to Russian naval strategy in the Black Sea, as a counter to threats from the South. Indeed, Sevastopol was the

scene of a major British, French and Sardinian siege in 1854-55, during the final phases of  the Crimean War. It again witnessed major battles in World War II. When Russia annexed Crimea in

March 2014, it declared Sevastopol as a federal city, the only other such cities being Moscow and St. Petersburg. Putin would be loath to lose it to Ukraine, just as Zelensky is determined

to win it back. The odds could indeed favour Zelensky. It is noteworthy that Russian forces have begun to dig trenches and prepare other defences, such as tank traps, in anticipation of an

attack on Crimea. In particular, the Russians have built a trench system, designed to give their troops maximum field of fire, that extends several miles around Medvedivka, which is near a

crossing to Ukraine. Clearly Moscow fears that a Ukrainian offensive could retake the peninsula. It has good reason to do so. As US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin recently put it, Ukraine

has “a very good chance” of launching a successful counteroffensive, once the ground hardens in in the coming weeks and manoeuvre units can exploit tanks and other armored vehicles to the

fullest. Putin should therefore consider whether now might be the time to reach out to the Ukrainians and begin a negotiation to bring the war to an end. Of course, the Kremlin, its

spokesmen and its fellow travellers in the West insist that Putin would never do any such thing. But they need to repeat their mantra until such time as Putin decides otherwise. He cannot be

expected to reach out directly to Zelensky, since in any event he sees the Ukrainian as nothing more than an American stooge. (Donald Trump and his acolytes see Zelensky the same way.)

Putin could, however, hint to a third country that he is ready to deal with Zelensky, if only indirectly. There are several candidates for which third country he might choose. He remains

close to Viktor Orban of Hungary. As the leader of a NATO member state, Orban would have direct access to Washington, London, Paris, Berlin, Warsaw and the other players that support

Ukraine. India’s Narendra Modi, who has simultaneously maintained cordial relations with Moscow and Washington, would be another, though less obvious candidate. Brazil may be another; there

are reports that Putin has been in contact with the Lula government. There are many in Washington, including some senior Democrats on Capitol Hill, as well as advocates of focusing all of

America’s attention on the perceived threat from China, both of whom would pounce upon any indication that Putin is ready to talk. The US cannot force Zelensky to take the initial step in

proposing to negotiate with Russia, much less ignore him, as it did the former Afghan president Ashraf Ghani when it reached a giveaway agreement with the Taliban. A Ukrainian initiative

while Russia continued to occupy Ukrainian soil would effectively signal that Kyiv was ready to concede territory to its aggressor neighbour. On the other hand, were Putin to make the first

move, Washington could then use its considerable influence to bring Zelensky to the negotiating table. The choice, therefore, is Putin’s. He can press on with a war that has isolated him

from the West, added hugely to the sanctions his country already faced, and generated the very real prospect of Ukrainian advances in both the Donbas and Crimea that will wipe out whatever

gains Moscow’s forces initially achieved, at the cost of many tens of thousands of Russian dead. Or he can indicate that he is prepared to negotiate a peace agreement before he loses Crimea.

Putin squandered everything when he impulsively ordered his forces to attack Ukraine on February 24, 2021. Peace now would allow him, and more importantly his country, to regain a degree of

dignity and perhaps economic relief. A MESSAGE FROM THEARTICLE _We are the only publication that’s committed to covering every angle. We have an important contribution to make, one that’s

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